[Mary] Hi there. Welcome to Safety Labs. There's a kind of magical synthesis that, as we get older, weaves together our experiences, education, and working life. Threads that seemed completely unrelated at the time intertwine and form a coherent picture that defines our career — but only as we look back on it. It's not a picture that anyone can predict, and it's uniquely ours. Today I'd like to walk you through the career of our guest, because each layer of her experience adds depth to her understanding of safety leadership.
Gretchen Haskins is a board member for Heli-Offshore, an organization dedicated to global aviation safety. She's an industry leader in safety performance improvement and an internationally recognized expert in human factors. Previously, she was CEO of Heli-Offshore, and before that served on the board of the UK Civil Aviation Authority. Prior to that, Gretchen was group director of safety at the UK air traffic company NATS, where she championed activities to support frontline operational safety. Gretchen has experience in nuclear certification, safety of intercontinental ballistic missiles, joint airworthiness trials for military aircraft, defense system design, and as an expert advisor to NATO on human performance and safety-critical systems. She is a US Air Force and Human Factors Engineering graduate. Gretchen joins us from Winchester, in the south of England. Welcome.
[Gretchen] Hi, nice to be here.
[Mary] Speaking of retrospect, let's start actually before the start of your career. You lost your mother in a car crash when you were nineteen. At the time, did you connect that experience of loss to safety? Or did its influence on your life and career only become clear to you years later?
[Gretchen] Very much the latter — it only became clear probably in my almost-fifties. So it took a long time, and in retrospect it's so obvious. I just didn't want anyone else to lose a loved one through an accident. That was obviously a huge driving force in my trying to learn and grow and understand what works in safety. I was always very results-oriented, and I now know it was because I just wanted it to work — I wanted to understand what would actually save lives.
[Mary] In terms of your career, you started with human factors and human-computer interaction. What drew you into that?
[Gretchen] It's funny. I was a cadet at the US Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs. Airplanes in those days had knobs and dials, everything was mechanical. And a man called Jim Rising from Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio came to the Academy and showed us pictures of glass cockpits — pathways in the sky that could guide pilots through their routes. It was so intuitive, like today's computer games. And I was hooked. I thought, we could design things for people that just make so much more sense and are so much easier for them to do their job.
[Mary] You were working on military systems where the stakes are extremely high. What did those projects teach you about designing systems?
[Gretchen] I worked in what is today Space Command — but back then it had its roots in John F. Kennedy saying we will get to the moon by the end of the decade. People were learning to do concurrent engineering and to test things before they went live. They really needed to look at the whole system: the human, of course, supported by the procedures, the training, and the equipment to do the job safely and effectively. I didn't realize it at the time, but the human factors department there was really extraordinary. This was the mid-eighties, and we were doing rapid prototyping using Fortran — so it wasn't all that rapid — but we had usability sessions with the end users. I think we put in one of the very first touch screens ever, looking at pointing at something you wanted instead of typing lines of code, and we were doing this as a team.
I worked for a general who, I now know, created beautiful psychological safety. He gave us a speech where he said: if this project is a result of my brain alone and the things I tell you to do, we are in trouble. We need to use all of our brains. I need you to speak up if you think I've got it wrong, if you have a better idea — it's your responsibility to help us get this right. He knew, even back then, how to get a team really working together and using all of its brains to get the best results.
[Mary] At that stage of your career, your work was focused more on efficiency and effectiveness than on safety per se. At what point did you realize that the tools and mindset that bring efficiency and effectiveness could also be used to design accidents out before they happen?
[Gretchen] I think that happened when I got to the UK air traffic control company NATS. The operations director there really wanted me to focus particularly on safety. Air traffic control is a really interesting area to work, because in our case we'd never had a mid-air collision, never had a fatality. We did have leading indicator information — any time two aircraft got within a certain part of the airspace, we knew it and we looked at what caused it. So we were already having to dig beneath the surface, and that caused us to really want to look at what are the critical things people do on a typical day that actually make the system safe or unsafe? And how do we design the system around the people that helps them do their job safely every day?
I remember our great CEO, Paul Barron — he was amazing. He brought us in and said, let's look at what good would look like for safety, how would we like things to be. And we decided to design out our most serious incidents. We decided on a tagline: "proactive in safety." This was back in 2005. The best way to explain it is probably through an example.
The first thing we did was decide to collaborate. We had previously had a mindset of making sure no accident ever happened due to us — but we decided to change that and say we don't want an accident in our airspace, whatever the cause. That increased our partnership with the other stakeholders in the aviation system: the airlines, the airports, general aviation pilots, the regulators. We wanted to come together and focus on how do we design the risk out of the system, make it fail safe? That was our starting point.
The second thing was looking at critical tasks. One of our risks is something called an airspace infringement — when an aircraft from outside controlled airspace flies into the airspace, usually near an airport like Heathrow or Gatwick. That can be a problem because those aircraft aren't as well equipped as commercial airliners, and sometimes they may be lost. That's how you can get a mid-air collision. So we took airspace infringements and asked: what are the critical tasks that people have to get right to avoid this? It came down to four specific tasks. You need to plan the route to avoid the airspace in the first place — and planning is usually done by the pilots, not air traffic control, so how could we help pilots plan well? Second, navigate so you don't get lost. Third, someone or something needs to detect that an infringement is about to happen, as early as possible. And fourth, avoid. So this problem got turned from "an error made by the pilot" into four tasks we want to optimize performance on: plan, navigate, detect, avoid. And once we had that, it really opened things up.
We got our partners together and brainstormed solutions — technologies, procedures, training, information flows, communication, all kinds of things. It changed the freedom we had to invent safety improvement. I can't really describe it enough — it turned a switch. One thing we came up with was giving airspace maps in software form to the people who did flight planning and navigation systems, something like a sat-nav for aircraft, so pilots could be alerted if they were approaching controlled airspace. We also ended up creating a large service that looked outside of controlled airspace and we put it at Farnborough Airport — usually controllers look inside, but this was almost like defensive controlling, looking further out and talking to general aviation pilots before they started approaching the airspace. And we got tools for controllers that gave them better alerts, and some improved technology on board aircraft.
All of this made an absolute step change in the incidents we had. We went from a company that was pretty good at safety and could improve performance by about seven percent a year — when we moved to this proactive approach, we got seventy percent improvement in three years. And that performance stayed in, because we weren't running a poster campaign, we were changing the system, the infrastructure people had to work within to do their jobs. That was a more permanent change.
[Mary] How do you think your human factors background changed the way you thought about what a safety role could be?
[Gretchen] I was trained to think about how do we design a system to help people do their job better? There are a lot of tools in human factors — task analysis, information flows, rapid prototyping — that help you get into the mind of the user and work with them to optimize the system. I think that helped a lot in safety. And my early work in the military got me thinking: you can design the result you want. You don't have to wait for an accident or something to go wrong and react. You can design in safety. That was an important mindset.
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And now, back to our interview. How and when did you shift your perspective from fixing issues to shaping strategy?
[Gretchen] I think it was again at NATS — the challenge our CEO and operations director set for us: what would good look like in the future, and how do we set up things to get there? We created a strategic plan for safety. I'd fully recommend that any team or organization do this. At Heli-Offshore, we have a safety strategy for the global helicopter industry — you could do it at whatever scale or level you want, but the thought process is the same. What are my risks, what are the things that could kill people in my area? What would good look like in terms of the critical tasks people do on a typical day? What are the actions or improvements you can make to improve that performance? And who can you partner and collaborate with to get that done?
We created work streams and work groups to address different areas, got involved with our partners, came up with far more ideas than we would have inside our own company alone, and tracked our progress with the board. Instead of the board progress report being mainly backward-looking, it became mainly forward-looking: what have we achieved, but also what are we doing next, and are we focusing on the right areas to get the most performance improvement in the next period? It was a more productive conversation that helped us get results faster.
[Mary] You moved from NATS into the UK Civil Aviation Authority — from being outside the regulatory world to inside it. What did you learn from that change of perspective?
[Gretchen] I had been complaining about the regulator, because the things I saw in the checklists, the regulation, and the audits we were getting weren't the things that were keeping me awake at night operationally — the things I thought could actually cause a mid-air collision over London. Having said that, we had an amazing UK CAA inspector called Phil Trang at NATS, who worked alongside our controllers, listened to their concerns, and helped get really important issues addressed — he was brilliant. But strategically, the compliance rules didn't add up to safety risk management, and when I looked at our strategy and those rules, I couldn't see a strong link between them. So, of course, they said, "well, why don't you go fix it then?" Big mouth. And so I went to become group safety director at the UK CAA.
On the ninth day of my job there, the volcano in Iceland erupted and stopped all air traffic. I have to laugh now because I'd been thinking we'd do team building, create a strong bond — and of course we were all up at two in the morning doing crisis management. That built a pretty strong team pretty quickly. I'm really proud of the work the UK CAA did. Our head of airworthiness, Pork Kelleher, ran an almost twenty-four-hour call with experts from around the world — volcanologists and aviation specialists — working together with engine manufacturers to understand really how much volcanic ash engines could withstand, and whether the current standards were actually appropriate. We worked with Eurocontrol and EASA to ensure that once we had agreed safe levels of volcanic ash, those would be reflected in the airspace maps and the overall rules going forward. Four days of crazy, but I'm very proud that we found a safety solution that allowed people to fly safely.
[Mary] You had to work with foreign carriers and overseas airfields where you had no regulatory authority. What did you learn about leadership and forming partnerships to improve safety where you had less control?
[Gretchen] A couple of things happened at the CAA. I kind of rinsed and repeated the idea of getting clear on purpose. We understood that our purpose had been defined as "assuring the UK government that aviation is acceptably safe" — and that led us towards setting policy, rules, and auditing compliance. We felt that was a bit constrained, and that our role was really more safety-oriented than that. So we redefined it as: keeping UK citizens safe from aviation — wherever they fly in the world, and also if they're not flying and they don't want an aircraft or a drone landing on their head. That exploded the scope of what we might do as a regulator.
Then we started looking at where the areas of biggest risk were. We asked our airlines where in the world they were most concerned about flying, and we looked at our data to see where near misses were happening and which foreign carriers were involved. We also looked at working with the military, since UK airspace is quite limited.
That changed the context. And I always say your actions are shaped by your context — setting the most powerful context helps you create the most powerful actions. So we created this idea of leadership beyond authority: how do we partner with people we don't regulate in other countries or in the military, and how do we encourage them to want to partner with us? It was very much listening to their issues and concerns, sharing ours, and assuming that together we'd be able to create effective solutions.
One example: one of our big airlines was concerned about flying to a particular destination because it was always complicated — they felt they were given a different route every time, and the multiple heading changes meant they could easily make a mistake. So we got the pilots from our country and the controllers from that country together. The pilot said: we just want you to keep it standard. We've been up all night, we're tired, we could make a mistake. If it takes five more minutes, that's okay. And the controller said: we didn't realize — we were trying to get you there as fast as possible, giving you the best service we could. That was changed in one conversation, and it made a huge difference for every pilot who flew that route afterwards.
[Mary] I want to pull out one thing you said — the mission went from "reassuring the government" to "keeping people safe." The word "reassure" really jumps out, because it's like trying to control a feeling rather than changing reality.
[Gretchen] Yes. It was a really rewarding time. A woman called Hazel Courtney, who I'm a huge fan of, chaired the ICAO Annex 19 working group, which delivered in record time Annex 19 on safety management systems and state safety programs — getting that strategic intent in, along with more proactive safety approaches and human factors. Hazel's background is human factors as well. And we created something called performance-based regulation, which focused on whether day-to-day performance of critical tasks was improving in ways that reduce risk and help keep people safe. Performance-based regulation has pretty much taken off around the world in various guises.
[Mary] So when you were at Heli-Offshore, you told me when we spoke before the show that at the beginning you had five big CEOs who didn't trust each other, and a wider industry that didn't trust the five CEOs. How did you approach that?
[Gretchen] I was really lucky because the five CEOs — it was started by a wonderful chairman named Bill Childs, who led for ten years — were an excellent group of very capable people who gave me pretty free rein. My first thought was about relationships. We needed to get to our common purpose and listen to each other about what was important to each person and why safety mattered. That gave us a basis to work together.
When we got to the wider group of companies, I'll never forget one meeting where Lance Bosflug, who was amazing, said: I would just like anyone in this room who knows someone who has died in a helicopter accident to raise their hand. A lot of people had been in the military, general aviation, and offshore. A lot of hands went up. And that was a demonstration of our common purpose — people almost looked each other in the eye and said, anybody's accident is everybody's accident. People recognized that we all bear the reputational scars, the rising insurance costs, and the sadness of what it does to people's lives. That was the right place to start.
Then we needed some process. We needed to agree the top risks, get experts together from wherever they came from and ensure they all felt listened to, make our board structure more inclusive of our membership, and deliver a few things that made a real difference. One of the first was a best practice guidance document on health and usage monitoring systems — the systems engineers use to detect potential faults in a helicopter. I remember the big companies saying, my God, we learned some really good stuff from the small companies. When the engineers got together and talked about their common concerns and common need for solutions, they created some good answers together and shared them with the whole global industry. That started to build trust. And we got to have some fun with it.
I'd encourage anyone interested to go look at the Heli-Offshore website — helioffshore.org. On there is the safety performance model, which is a one-page summary of what are the things that could kill you, what do you have to be good at on a typical day, and then a whole bunch of safety improvement materials based around improving those critical tasks. All of it is available for everyone to share and benefit from.
It's now eleven years since we started. Some people I know who were clear enemies are now very best friends. And I know that when someone has an incident now, they share it openly and freely with the whole community, and the whole mindset is about what can we learn and how can we make sure this doesn't happen again to anyone. That, for me — that's when you know the collaboration is really working.
[Mary] As you were speaking, the phrase came to me that the real enemy is isolation. Let me walk through some of the patterns I've noticed in how you go about your work, because there does seem to be a consistent approach across all these contexts. The first one you've talked about quite a bit is aligning around the "why" — is there anything else you'd add to that phase?
[Gretchen] The only thing I'd add is: make it bigger than you think. Don't stick with the traditional definition of what we've always done. I was involved in some of the work following the Boeing 737 MAX accidents, and one thing I observed was that aviation had partitioned risk so that each part is exclusively responsible for its bit. That's gotten us a long way in terms of managing risk and clear accountabilities. But I think Boeing was on the hook for building an aircraft that was safe — they weren't, in their mindset, thinking about building an aircraft that could be operated safely every day in the field. The feedback loop between the airlines and Boeing, to see whether the design assumptions were holding up in real operations, was okay but not brilliant.
The more our mindset is on the total system — I started using the term "total system" at one point: all of it, the human, the machine, the procedures, the training, and all the organizations and interfaces — the more freedom there is in finding solutions to fix your problem, and the more opportunity there is to manage risks that live in the interfaces. Often there is risk in the interfaces that needs to be managed and that can cause the problem. So: make it big.
[Mary] The next one I'm curious about is creating a powerful context. Context is something we swim in — so how do you create or influence it?
[Gretchen] The context of "proactive in safety and preventing accidents before they occur" is powerful — no one wants to go through the accident phase, and it helps senior managers feel like there are specific things to get on with rather than waiting for something to go wrong. I also like a context that is personally powerful, including the language we use. There's a man called Adam Johns who gives a brilliant talk on this. Rather than talking about investigations, causal factors, and who was responsible, we can talk about learning, opportunities, and improvements. I've almost stopped using the word "error" — not because it's not a useful word, but I'd rather talk about performance and accuracy. Let's go from ninety-five to ninety-nine percent accuracy if it's going to make a critical difference to saving lives. I think it's more motivating for people.
We had Sir Matthew Pinsent come to speak at a Heli-Offshore conference — our tagline was "excellence where it counts to saving lives." He talked about how they would set goals as Olympic rowers, and then the next year set a goal beyond what they'd thought was possible before, and kept at it, always creating a strategy to achieve a higher level of performance. Doing that in safety — in the areas that matter most to saving lives, focusing on the critical tasks that will make the biggest difference, and taking the actions that will deliver the greatest value — that mindset of excellence where it counts is a very powerful context. Performance improvement rather than risk reduction is another way to frame it. It's like working toward the presence of something instead of the absence of something else.
And I think the NCAP ratings for cars were fantastic in this regard — they started talking about obstacle avoidance as a positive capability you want to be good at, detecting and avoiding obstacles. And in the last decade there's been this huge influx of new technologies: things in your mirrors showing someone's in your blind spot, lane assist, automatic braking. I think senior leaders started getting a little competitive to build those capabilities sooner and give better safety value to customers. We could do more of that in other industries.
[Mary] You've talked about forming partnerships — is there anything you'd add about how to form them or why to?
[Gretchen] I tried to do a lot of listening in Heli-Offshore. I would hear people say "it's them, they need to do something" — and I would encourage them: what could you do to influence them, to partner them, to let them know? How can they fix it if they don't know? And I always try, if I ever hear anyone saying "them," to say: us-and-them isn't a powerful context. How would we turn that to us-and-us? We even had to catch ourselves at the CAA doing it. People would say, "they just won't do that" or "they just don't get it" — and I made it a practice to go to those people. If I couldn't get them to talk directly, I might facilitate a meeting between the three of us. I'd go and say, is it possible you could do this? What would it take, what would be the reason why you might want to, how could it help the industry? And then at the next conference, those people would show up doing the very thing others said they wouldn't. It just started breaking down barriers. People want to help — presenting things in terms of how it would help others is really motivating.
[Mary] The next step is building an action plan — what advice do you have for that?
[Gretchen] I love a good brainstorm. But first, I love to ask: what would good look like? I try to guide people to answer that in terms of critical task performance. If you're trying to avoid an obstacle, you need to be good at detecting obstacles. So "good" might look like: we could detect a hundred percent of obstacles at least ten seconds in advance, giving us time to avoid them. That kind of conversation translates a problem from a negative into a positive, and brings people onto the same page about what any action needs to achieve. Then I like to create thoughts about the different actions we could take — technology, training, procedures, permissions we could give people, culture, and so on. And then: who else could help us, who might have more ideas, are there actions others could take that would help?
Then write it down as a plan and turn it into a project with real resources and milestones. It is a project as important as any other project to the organization and should be run just as professionally. If you're doing it across multiple organizations it gets a bit more complicated, but you can still make it a project, have a project manager, a board sponsor, and get it funded appropriately.
Let me tell a story about how you get senior managers to want to do safety, which I know is something a lot of people struggle with. Senior managers are people too — they have to make decisions and do tasks, and we can design a system that gives them better information, better options about what action to take, and makes it easier for them to do the right thing. So how did we get money out of the board at NATS to help reduce mid-air collisions?
One problem we had was something called level busts — where pilots fly three hundred feet above or below their assigned level. In airspace over London with over seven thousand aircraft a day, being at the wrong level is not good. First, we started to understand the scope of the problem. We had reports of level busts but only our own. We shared our data with all the airlines, the regulators, everyone we could find, and of course the order of magnitude of the problem turned out to be much larger than we could see from our one perspective.
Then we looked at critical tasks. One thing that happens is the pilot reads their altitude to the controller, the controller checks it against the assigned altitude, and if it's wrong, tells the pilot the correct level. So we asked the controllers: can you write down every time this happens for ten days, just put a tick on a little pad next to you? It wasn't very scientific — they didn't always remember — but what we found was that eleven hundred times in ten days, they corrected a missed readback. That's quite a lot. But they corrected it, so it was safe.
We then decided to pull the tapes and listen — a lot of hours of recordings — to check how many times the pilot read the wrong level and the controller did not catch it, because that's an instance where the aircraft is at the wrong level and neither pilot nor controller knows it. It turned out once in a thousand times the controllers missed it. Anyone who knows anything about human performance will say: that is excellent, beyond almost impossibly excellent performance — but they have systems that help them perform that well. Still, that meant once every ten days there was an aircraft at the wrong level and neither the pilot nor the controller knew it.
We took this to the board: here's what a mid-air collision over London would look like — here's a picture of seven thousand aircraft in that airspace. Here's what we saw from understanding the critical tasks on a typical day, here's how frequently this is actually happening, this is your exposure to the risk. And here's our solution: we want to downlink the selected flight level from the pilot to the controller and give an alert if they don't match. It wasn't an insubstantial investment, but the board were like: yes, of course. Very solid business case. So you need the action plan, and you need to get resources for it — either through little projects that succeed until they grow into bigger ones, or by making the business case by looking at normal work and working with your partners to get the data that convinces people it's worth acting on.
[Mary] That brings us to the last step — measuring in terms of everyday tasks. How do you turn a high-level safety goal into something you can observe and test in normal work?
[Gretchen] In helicopters, our top three potential causes of a fatal accident are hitting an obstacle or the surface, loss of control, and any kind of technical failure to a critical part — like the rotor especially. We have a series of projects looking at each of those.
One example is the helicopter terrain awareness warning system — HTAWS — which warns the pilot they're about to hit something. About twenty-five percent of the risk in helicopter accidents involves hitting something, and the critical task is detecting it in time. So this system helps you detect sooner. We tweaked the algorithms to optimize them for offshore flying, and found that the improved system could give you warning eight to twenty-eight seconds sooner than the existing alerting system. In a helicopter, that's enormous. And it wasn't like we needed a whole new system — we just needed to change the algorithms in an existing system. So cost-benefit wise, it was pretty clear-cut.
If you understand the critical tasks — like detecting obstacles — you can measure accuracy, timeliness, and completeness: how many different obstacles can you detect? You can look at how you're doing today and assess any change in procedures, training, or equipment, and show the improvement. And it helps you make a really good business case that it's worth the money to invest in that safety technology.
[Mary] You also mentioned that leadership training did more for your safety influence than additional safety courses. What specific leadership skills or mindsets made the biggest difference in your career?
[Gretchen] I have to put in a plug for a company called First Human. The woman who trained me was Philita Fleming, and her colleagues there have also had a big influence on Heli-Offshore and the work I did at NATS and the CAA.
But my biggest challenge was this: because of losing my mother, I had a story in my head that I had to stop this happening to any other child, to any other person. I felt responsible. I had these skills and I thought you could design out accidents, so I needed to do it. But when I got afraid that I wasn't doing it well enough, that results weren't happening fast enough, I wasn't convincing someone — I got scared. And I can tell you, in some of the jobs I've had, I wasn't necessarily wrong to be worried. But I became less effective when I was operating from my fear. I was listening to my inner voice of fear rather than to the person I was trying to influence. I wasn't creating an opportunity for them to partner me and be a hero — it was almost self-fulfilling prophecy.
I've learned to take a break, get some sleep, work out, go for a walk, read a book — and then really get back in touch with my humanity: this is another human being. How do I give them the chance to be the most successful at their job? What do they want, need, or care about? I'd go back and listen better, and try to create a partnership again. Sometimes I'd have to say: I know I've been being an idiot, I'm a bit paranoid and here's why — but I think there's something here we could create together. How do you think we could go about it? Ask for help, be way more human about the whole thing.
If you find yourself acting from your fears, it's probably not working. If it starts not working, you're listening to yourself and not them. Get back to your dreams and listen from your dreams, and create partnerships to fulfil them.
[Mary] As you were speaking, I was thinking: fear is isolation. Fear isolates us from other people.
[Gretchen] One hundred percent. I have seen what I thought were impossible situations — relationships that seemed completely broken — mend through communication and listening, and creating something beyond yourself, beyond your fears. My favorite thing in the world is to see people achieve their full potential or even surprise themselves with what they can achieve, and creating an environment where it feels safe to do that. You can see and feel it when it happens, and it's magic as far as I'm concerned.
[Mary] You entered your safety career sideways, which frankly a lot of people do. If you were to design training for the next generation of safety professionals — people coming in with the specific purpose of working in safety — where would you focus?
[Gretchen] Very much on people skills and communication. The leadership training I received changed my entire life — all my relationships, you know, including the ones most people would never connect to a work skill. I think it's people skills, and also the confidence to be yourself and — warts and all — work together with other people toward a common aim. Safety leadership is about listening, working in partnership, and persevering despite challenges in a very human way.
[Mary] How can our listeners learn more about the topics in our discussion? You've mentioned a few resources as we went, but where would you point people?
[Gretchen] I love a book called "Being Human in Safety-Critical Organisations," by Dick Gregory and Paul Shanahan. They're not from aviation but they use examples from multiple industries to look at how you can create a more powerful system around the people. I really like it.
I also strongly recommend a document created by the International Association of Oil and Gas Producers and the Energy Institute together on learning from normal work — you can find it on their websites. It has examples for senior leaders on how to interact with the front line to understand what they call the four Ds: what's dumb, what's difficult, what's dangerous, and what's different from what you'd expect in the way people actually do their work. I'm beyond a huge fan of learning from normal work.
The leadership training at First Human, which I mentioned, is really great, and they offer various types of programs.
And finally, there's something called SKYbrary — a library of aviation safety-related information run by Eurocontrol, sponsored by the Flight Safety Foundation. It's a very good resource for safety information broadly.
[Mary] And where can our listeners find you on the web?
[Gretchen] I'm on LinkedIn — Gretchen Haskins. And I should definitely mention Heli-Offshore again — helioffshore.org. I'm on the board, and it's a unique, not-for-profit safety organization. The safety performance model and the resources on there are very useful, and it's all freely available for anyone interested.
[Mary] Well, that's our show, and I hope listeners enjoyed it as much as I did. Thank you for sharing your story, Gretchen.
[Gretchen] My pleasure, Mary.
[Mary] And thanks again to our listeners, and of course to the Safety Labs team. Bye for now. This podcast is created by Safety Products Global, the world's leading manufacturer of safety knives. Through our trusted brands, Klever, Slice, and PHC, we empower companies to prevent injuries by providing safer cutting tools for every material and application. Until next time, stay safe.
